Fuel Tank Follow Up: Sunshine Clarified, But Need for Reform Remains
By Wayne Tanaka, Chapter Director | Reading time: 10.5 minutes
Last month, we wrote about how the Department of Health’s Fuel Tank Advisory Committee (FTAC) meeting indicated a disturbing pivot towards the uncritical military deference and antipathy to public participation that led up to the ongoing Red Hill water crisis.
Only after a series of back-and-forth e-mails, including with the Hawaiʻi State Office of Information Practices, did the Department of Health relent, and offer to hold another meeting to take public testimony on the meeting’s agenda. Notably, at the subsequent FTAC meeting held on November 19, deputy director Kathy Ho did initially concede that going forward, public testimony must be taken with each agenda item as they are discussed - not hours later, at the end of the meeting.
However, what followed was almost as troubling as the meeting prior. Rather than the back-and-forth discussion with panelists and testifiers that has characterized every FTAC meeting prior, testifier questions were met with stares, and silence. Only after Board of Water Supply Chief Engineer and FTAC member Ernie Lau asked permission to ask questions - and a subsequent extended break, where Department of Health officials tried in vain to get a deputy attorney general to sign onto the Zoom platform - did some limited conversation take place.
Particularly reluctant to provide any responses were the EPA and Navy representatives, perhaps explaining the Health Department’s attempt to limit any interaction with testifiers. At one point, the EPA was asked if it would consider recognizing that Navy water customers had, in fact, been subjected to chronic exposures of jet fuel in their water prior to November 2021, as the Red Hill Registry and even the Department of Health had admitted in the months prior. EPA Region 9 Enforcement and Compliance Director Amy Miller simply said the agency would not respond to the question.
And even basic questions asked by FTAC members like Ernie Lau were met with evasive and nonresponsive answers. For example, when questioned whether all the water tanks contaminated with jet fuel four years ago had been cleaned, the Navy and EPA only said that there was a “cleaning schedule” and that the Navy was “in compliance.” Ironically, the EPA had most recently admitted in writing that the Navy had been given extensions to clean tanks that had still not been cleaned since the November 2021 fuel spill catastrophe - including the water tank located at Camp Smith in Hālawa.
Clearly, reform is needed for the FTAC, as the only public venue that brings together the Navy, state and federal regulators, elected officials, the Board of Water Supply, and community representatives, to discuss among themselves and with the community the latest developments in the Red Hill water crisis.
One simple, low hanging fruit toward this end would be to increase the frequency of FTAC meetings, from twice a year to once every three months. This would allow for shorter, less torturous agendas that would be much more accessible to public participation; more frequent check-ins on maintenance and remediation efforts, including feedback from the public and community experts on pressing issues like the Camp Smith water tank; and greater public transparency and accountability overall, in nothing less than the very water security of Oʻahu and the island’s future generations. Unfortunately, a proposal to do just this was narrowly voted down by the Department of Health, military, and state legislative representatives on the FTAC, with the Water Commission, Board of Water Supply, and community representatives all voting in favor of having more frequent meetings.
Fortunately, there is an opportunity to have our state legislature pass a bill requiring the FTAC to meet more frequently. If you would like to join the Sierra Club of Hawaiʻi in supporting legislation like this, and help ensure greater accessibility, transparency, and accountability in discussions and actions to heal and protect our water, be sure to sign up for legislative action alerts at hawaiicapitolwatch.org, and to take the Pledge to Our Wai, Pledge to Our Keiki - and tell your friends and networks to do the same!
UPCOMING EVENTS:
Be sure to check out the Red Hill CRI’s once-a-quarter meeting with the Navy on December 16 at 5 pm - visit their website as the date approaches for a registration link. Also, in case you missed it, be sure to check out their last meeting for an insightful and worrying presentation on the Camp Smith Water Tank situation, by Elin Bentanzo of Safe Water Engineering.
QUESTIONS UNANSWERED
The Navy and EPA’s refusal to answer questions at the last Fuel Tank Advisory Committee meeting in November left almost all of the testifiers’ questions unanswered. Facilitator and Hawaiʻi Department of Health deputy director Kathy Ho did suggest that these questions be submitted in writing to the FTAC - although only one FTAC member has provided any response thus far. We will continue to track these questions and share their answers if and when any responses from the FTAC members are provided:
Item 2.b – UH Red Hill Registry
The Red Hill Registry recognizes that Navy water consumers may have been exposed to jet fuel and other contaminants prior to November 2021 (as confirmed by water testing results and admitted by DOH staff). Will the EPA, DOH, and DLNR (Red Hill WAI) recognize that spills and even drinking water contamination may have occurred prior to November 2021 for site assessments, remediation, health impact tracking, and other activities in the decommissioning of the Red Hill facility? If not or no response, why not?
Item 3.a&b – Navy Red Hill Infrastructure & Environmental Updates
For DOH, EPA, DLNR (Red Hill WAI), CWRM, Navy, BWS - What concerns could there be about what happens to the fuel-absorbing foam proposed to be injected into the remaining pipelines at the facility (and how many miles of pipelines will be left/what volume of foam will be used?), and the coating being proposed for the inner tank walls, as these compounds potentially degrade over the next 20, 50, 100+ years, and what preventative measures if any have been considered to prevent the water table from being impacted?
1) For EPA, DOH, Navy, and CODEL - There are several water tanks that were impacted in November 2021 and that still havenʻt been cleaned. This includes the water tank at Camp Smith which had breaches and animals living inside the tank as well as sediment on its bottom during EPA inspections after the November spill. This particular tank hasnʻt been cleaned since 2013 and wonʻt be cleaned until 2030 - over 3 times the highly recommended minimum frequency for tank cleaning per the EPA and AWWA.
EPA Region VIII bacteriologists have likened this same situation to a “sleeping public health concern” given that pathogens in water tank sediment can remain undetected (and resistant to disinfectants) until something disturbs the sediment, like a telemetry issue or sudden water use (fire, etc.) that causes tank levels to drop. The Alamosa County salmonella outbreak which killed one person and sickened thousands is attributed to sediment disturbance in a drinking water tank that had not been cleaned in a little over a decade.
Will the Navy at least warn people at Camp Smith so they can do their own assessment of personal risk and have the freedom to take whatever precautions they feel is appropriate for them? Will the regulators require notice to consumers as a condition of their extension of time to continue using the Camp Smith tank for cleaning - as well as for any other tanks that have been granted extensions for cleaning?
2) For EPA, DOH, DLNR-Red Hill WAI, Navy, and CODEL: The Red Hill WAI has voiced significant concerns about relying only on "natural attenuation" as the remediation strategy for the 5k-2M gallons spilled at red hill and called for bioremediation or some other strategy to be explored and implemented. Otherwise, as weʻve seen in other places with WWII fuel contamination, we may be dealing with a contaminated aquifer for the next century or longer. The only active contaminant removal method Iʻve seen mentioned is soil vapor extraction, which does not remove PFAS, or jet fuel in the water table. What else is the Navy doing to explore other remediation strategies to actually clean the groundwater once we find the plume(s)? Has there been any RFPs or anything issued or budgeted for research? Will the regulators require something beyond soil vapor extraction? Will the Red Hill WAI report to the legislature about the lack of investment in remediating the aquifer? [NOTE: The Red Hill WAI Policy Coordinator did send along this pilot study, still pending review, indicating at least some preliminary research into remediation].
3) For EPA, DLNR-Red Hill WAI, Navy, and CODEL - It is going to cost $500M just to filter ~3.5 mgds at the Red Hill shaft for the next 50 years (not counting maintenance and other costs). What happens in terms of the process for budgeting another filtration system if the contamination plume is detected in the vicinity of another water source, including a municipal source? Will the Navy commit to pursuing a contingency fund to expedite filter construction and will the CODEL support a budget request?
4) For the Navy and EPA - why is it that the ʻAiea-Hālawa GAC-IX filter is being proposed for removal after 9 quarters when there is no indication the PFAS detections are going down? This timeline seems arbitrary - is this just to avoid triggering environmental review by calling it a “temporary” system? What will be used to determine if PFAS levels are acceptable at that time - the 4 ppt standard enforceable in 2029 or another standard?
Item 3.c – DOH & EPA Red Hill Regulatory Updates
For DOH and EPA - for the site assessments are you including assessments of potential releases from the 72 unscheduled fuel movements and the report of a 1.2M gallon spill? Are you accounting for potential chronic releases that may have occurred due to the insufficient monitoring system(s) that were in place? Are you accounting for the Red Hill Oily Waste Disposal Site?
1) For DOH, EPA, and Navy - Both the NASEM and CRI have heard from retired EPA officials and affected individuals about concerning irregularities in past water sampling including retesting long-expired samples, unexplained requests to delete chromatograms, and decisions to stop including the full range of analytes that were previously detected at the red hill shaft that could have come from other Navy sources, such as the oily waste pit. What is being done to assure better data governance and greater oversight, transparency, and accountability going forward, to avoid future irregularities and to build trust in the data?
2) For DOH - will the DOH use its regulatory authority to create a binding remediation standard on the Navy? Why or why not?
3) For DOH and EPA - has potential contamination from the Oily Waste Disposal Site been characterized and using what methods?
4) For EPA - Has the Navy’s still-deficient risk and resiliency assessment (after findings in both 2022 and 2024) been revised and reviewed? It was supposed to be submitted in September, was it? Why not at least let the public know if it was not?
5) For EPA and Navy - Have water system operator SOPs been developed and submitted/approved in order to protect water system consumers as required by the EPA? Why is the EPA letting the Navy take such a long time with developing SOPs? What are the Navyʻs excuses for taking 2 years to come up with SOPs it should have had years ago?
Item 4.a – Navy Field-Constructed Tanks Updates
1) For Navy - What does “storing infiltration water” mean for the Kuahua tanks? Is this water that just leaks into the tanks?
2) For Navy and EPA - What is long-term monitoring showing for the Kipapa tanks? What happens if groundwater contamination is detected?
3) For Navy - What is the timeline for PMRF USTs to be converted to above ground tanks? What are the plans to remediate those USTs, how much will it cost and how long will it take?
Item 5.a – UH SOEST Red Hill Studies
For Navy, DOH, and EPA - It’s been over 10 years and we still apparently can’t figure out ground water flow or contaminant fate and transport. We don’t even know if contamination from the Red Hill Oily Waste Disposal Site could lead to contamination of the Red Hill shaft or other water sources. What implications does this have for the reliability of the filtration system being proposed for the Red Hill shaft? For example, if a slug or slugs of contamination hit the Red Hill shaft or ʻAiea-Hālawa shaft, to what degree of contamination (and for what potential contaminants) will the proposed filters be effective, and for what contaminants?