Red Hill Update: 300-Gallon Fuel Spill, Navy’s Closure Plans, July Meeting Recap & More

By Madison Owens, Red Hill Organizer and Wayne Tanaka, Chapter Director | Reading time: 10 minutes

This month’s update covers key updates from the July Red Hill informational briefing and the Community Representation Initiative meeting with the Navy and Environmental Protection Agency, including the most recent 300-gallon fuel spill, the Navy’s plans to reactivate their ‘Aiea-Hālawa and Red Hill shafts, and the $500 million construction of a water filtration system. We also cover the Navy’s latest closure plan for the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility and concerns raised over its “closure-in-place” strategy. Read on for critical updates and growing community concerns – for our ‘āina and for our future.

July CRI Meeting with the Navy

The Red Hill Community Representation Initiative (CRI) held its 22nd meeting on July 31, the second this year attended by the Navy. Department of Health and EPA representatives also attended.

CRI members unanimously urged the EPA to allow whistleblower and Army Maj. Mandy Feindt to participate as a duly elected member of the CRI. Maj. Feindt had been kicked off of the CRI for refusing to agree to the EPA’s “ground rules” - opposed by 57 community organizations - that unilaterally stripped the CRI of its ability to raise and have community concerns addressed.  Members noted Maj. Feindt’s value to their work, the fact that she was elected to the CRI by the public, and that her criticisms of Navy leaders should not be used to silence her and the community members she represents. Nonetheless, the EPA rejected their requests.

Department of Health and Navy representatives provided some additional information about the reported 300 gallons of fuel that had been spilled at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam on July 1, allegedly from an active fuel pipeline not connected to Red Hill and not near a water source. According to Admiral Williams, an Army Corps of Engineer contractor was responsible for the spill. Department of Health deputy Kathy Ho noted that a report on the incident was due soon, but that department inspectors had done a visual site inspection and were “satisfied” with the clean up. Few other details were provided and Navy representatives responded to CRI members’ questions by directing them to the pending report.  

Navy representatives also reviewed their plans to “reactivate” its ‘Aiea-Hālawa and Red Hill drinking water shafts, using granulated activated carbon and ion exchange membrane technology (GAC/IX) to filter water from these shafts before delivering it to the Pearl Harbor drinking water system. 

Notably, bimonthly (once every two months) testing for PFAS at the ʻAiea-Hālawa shaft indicated concerning levels of various PFAS types in the water at the shaft, including PFOA and PFOS exceeding the 4 part per trillion maximum contaminant level established by the EPA and currently set to be enforced in 2029. A temporary GAC/IX filter has undergone a pilot study to determine whether it can sufficiently reduce the level of PFAS in water coming from the ʻAiea-Hālawa shaft before that shaft is “reactivated” and used to provide water to Pearl Harbor water system consumers. Department of Health representatives noted that the pilot study indicated that the GAC/IX system was reducing PFAS levels to “non-detect,” although it was unclear how effective this system would be over time, as PFAS and other contaminants built up in its filters.

The Navy directed questions about the potential source of this PFAS contamination to the Pearl Harbor Restoration Advisory Board and NAVFAC’s environmental restoration program for Red Hill. 

A permanent filtration system will also be constructed to filter water from the Red Hill shaft. The cost of constructing this system, which has a 50 year expected useful life, is estimated to be $500,000,000.

CRI members implored Navy representatives to ensure residents are informed of the reactivation of the shafts. 

CRI members were also told that the Navy was not meeting with BWS Chief Engineer Ernie Lau, after the BWS filed a lawsuit to recover $1.2B in damages from the November 2021 Red Hill spill. Notably, the BWS was forced to file this lawsuit because the Navy refused its request for compensation.

Given the limited time allowed for Red Hill CRI meetings under the EPA’s “ground rules,” numerous questions about the reactivation plans went unanswered, including:

  • Why the ‘Aiea-Hālawa shaft GAC/IX filter is planned to be “disconnected” in 27 months, if water from the shaft meets all MCLs?

  • What MCLs will be used to determine if the filter can be disconnected - the current EPA MCL of 70 ppt for PFAS, or the 4 ppt MCL that will not technically be in place until 2029?

  • Why the Navy has not waited for a complete groundwater model to determine whether and how contamination under the Red Hill facility might migrate toward the Red Hill and ʻAiea-Hālawa shafts over time, particularly since adjacent BWS wells have been shut down indefinitely?

among others.

Navy representatives then presented and took CRI questions on the fourth supplement of its 2022 Red Hill Closure Plan. This supplement provided various details on the Navy Closure Task Force’s “closure-in-place” strategy,  pipeline removal, physical modifications to be made to the facility, and the documentation of historic equipment connections at the facility. Any decision on the future “reuse” of the Red Hill facility will be made by the Department of Defense - likely the Secretary of Defense - at a future date. Plans for continued monitoring of groundwater after closure - something critically needed in light of the 200,000 to 2 million gallons of fuel and other contaminants released from the Red Hill Facility over the past 80 years - are also being separately developed.

CRI members raised concerns about the potential long-term impacts from “closure-in-place,” including the potential for cancer-causing chromium in tank liners and pipelines to eventually be released as the facility and its twenty, twenty-five story tanks continue to corrode. Navy representatives were urged to monitor groundwater for chromium, which is currently not done. 

A CRI request to conduct a site visit was also rejected, despite the fact that tours had been regularly conducted when the Red Hill facility was fully operational.  

Again, the time constraints created by the EPA’s “ground rules” left many questions unanswered, as the EPA facilitator cut the discussion item short to move on to public testimony, which were limited to 30 minutes. Under the ground rules, no responses to public testimony were allowed. Nonetheless, members of the community called on the EPA and Navy to acknowledge the trauma still carried by many, including CRI members; to restore Maj. Feindt to the CRI; to recognize the depth to which Native Hawaiians are tied to the health of their ancestral ‘āina and wai; and to recognize the continued lack of trust from the community, among other comments. 

Maj. Feindt also made an appearance, continuing her tireless advocacy for accountability. 

BWS Chief Engineer Ernie Lau also testified to encourage community members to learn more about PFAS contamination and remediation issues, including by visiting redhillern.com, and attending the August 27 Pearl Harbor Restoration Advisory Board meeting.

BWS engineer Joyce Lin also raised concerns and asked for information regarding the closure plan, including the fuel-absorbing foam that will be used to fill the pipes that remain in the facility after closure.  Her question went unanswered.

Red Hill Informational Briefing 

On Monday, July 14 2025, the Hawaiʻi State House Special Committee on Red Hill held an informational briefing with the US Navy. Committee members included Representatives Linda Ichiyama (Co-chair), Nicole Lowen (Co-Chair), Della Au Belatti, Shirley Ann Templo, Mark J. Hashem, Gregg Takayama and Garner Shimizu. Representatives from the Navy included Admiral Marc Williams and Commander Ben Dunn, and NAVFAC Program Manager Jocelyn Tomashiro. 

No testimony was accepted.

Key updates from the briefing:

  • Change in Command: Rear Admiral Collins will replace Admiral Stephen Barnett as commander of the Navy Closure Task Force–Red Hill and Navy Region Hawai‘i. 

  • PFAS Investigation: Ongoing Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) Investigation following the 2022 Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) is ongoing under CERCLA. This includes using a drill to take soil samples into the ground near Adit 3 where the AFFF leaked out of the facility and into the ground. Details as to where and how those samples would be taken to delineate the area and depth of PFAS contamination were not provided. Information can be found at redhillern.com

  • NAVFAC Staffing Challenges: Prior to the recent federal budget cuts, the NAVFAC team working on PFAS remediation had 6 vacancies out of a total 15 positions. Federal budget cuts resulted in two more vacancies, leaving the team at less than half of its capacity. With staffing so limited, NAVFAC must now prioritize only the highest-risk sites–limiting their capacity and delaying progress at many other contaminated areas, all of which require attention. 

  • Pigging Operations: A pipe size foam cylinder will be used to clear the remaining 4,000 gallons of residual fuel and debris from the pipelines remaining at the Red Hill Facility. A marine chemist will inspect cleaned pipes before dismantling them. 

  • Pipeline Removal: A Navy contractor will begin removing approximately 10 miles of pipeline later this year. DOH and EPA are currently reviewing the removal plans. NCTF–RH explained that pipes will be cleaned, cut, and shipped to the continent for recycling.

  • Tank Closure Plan Supplement 4: Released to regulators in May 2025 and shared with the public in July 2025. 

    • The Navy says it will proceed with closure plans regardless of  ‘beneficial re-use’ plans, which will be decided at a later date by the Department of Defense.

    • The Red Hill tanks and surge tanks will be closed in place.

    • The closure of the Red Hill Facility is expected to be completed in 2028.

    • Long-term remediation and monitoring is expected to last decades.

  • Navy ‘Aiea-Hālawa Shaft Reactivation: 

    • The Navy plans to reactivate its ‘Aiea-Halawa Shaft this summer, with DOH oversight. The Navy has reportedly been preparing this since 2022–information that has alarmed many in the community who were unaware of the Navy’s plans. 

  • Navy Red Hill Shaft Reactivation:

    • Reactivation of the Red Hill Shaft is expected in 2027, pending the installation of a water treatment system in coordination with DOH. The staggering investment of $500 million from the federal government– covered by taxpayers – underscores the ongoing cost and long-term burden of the Red Hill disaster and military negligence.

Despite NCTF-RH claims that the BWS was consulted in the development of the Navy’s drinking water monitoring plan, BWS has since clarified that they were not meaningfully included. While BWS regularly attends expert meetings, they are not granted the same level of access to Navy data as EPA and DOH. This hampers BWS’s ability to engage in informed technical dialogue, share concerns, and provide expertise. As a public water supplier directly affected by the Navy’s actions, BWS deserves meaningful inclusion–not to be sidelined. Watch the full meeting here

OIG Confirms Red Hill Whistleblower Rights Were Violated

A new report from the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (OIG) confirms that Army Maj. Mandy Feindt—who emerged as a vocal critic of the Red Hill water contamination—was unlawfully restricted by her supervisor from speaking out about the water crisis to Congress. 

In 2021, when jet fuel from the Navy’s Red Hill facility poisoned Oʻahu's drinking water—sickening thousands of individuals, including her own children—Feindt refused to stay silent. She spoke up at town halls, posted on social media, and eventually reached out to members of Congress about the need for better medical care and compassionate transfer for impacted families.

While military personnel are legally allowed to talk to Congress and safety hotlines, Feindt’s supervisor all but admitted that a number of negative employment actions taken against her were because she had “brought this on yourself” by, among other things, taking her concerns “all the way to Congress.” 

The OIG report found it "plausible and credible" that Feindt’s right to communicate with Congress had been violated, and recommended action against her supervisor. However, what was supposed to be a 120-day investigation dragged on for more than three years – and by its conclusion, the accused supervisor had already retired, raising concerns that he will escape any real accountability. 

Feindt says she went from being a respected officer to being overlooked for promotion and professionally isolated—all for speaking truth to power, and standing up for the many, many other families whose lives had been upended by the Navy’s negligence. She is now urging the Department of Defense to strengthen protections for whistleblowers while their claims are being investigated.

Upcoming Events & Announcements

  • Red Hill Registry Launches

  • NCTF Open House

    • Date: August 20, 2025 5-7PM

    • Location: O‘ahu Veterans Center (1298 Kukila St., Honolulu, HI 96818)

  • Pearl Harbor-Hickam-Kalaeloa Restoration Advisory Board Meeting

    • Date: August 27, 2025, 6-8PM

    • Location: O‘ahu Veterans Center (1298 Kukila St., Honolulu, HI 96818)

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25 Years of Implementing Ka Paʻakai: Honoring Native Hawaiian Rights in Land Use Decisions